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Introduction  
 
For much of the twentieth Century, the interrelationship between class and social democracy was 
fundamental. Electorally, parties were originally rooted in the working class, which provided the 
bedrock of their political support, and the core of their identity. Programmatically, in the post-
war era, Keynesian political economy provided the theoretical justification for redistribution 
towards workers as a core element of social democracy. The relationship was never that 
straightforward even in social democracy’s ‘golden age’. By the end of the 20th Century, it has 
become a good deal more problematic. This article explores the enduring relevance (or 
otherwise) of class, and in particular of the working class, to social democracy through 
comparative analysis of the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party (PS - Parti 
Socialiste) at the beginning of the 21st Century.  
  
In the wake of a widely touted decline in class voting, and socio-economic change undermining 
the traditional working class electoral base of social democracy, with the strength of class and 
partisan identification weakening, class identities fragmenting, and class structure becoming 
more complex and variegated, many amongst party elites became convinced of the need to 
pursue increasingly ‘catch-all’ strategies less rooted in the working class, or indeed in the 
concept of class. The strategy, whilst it has certain benefits, also has costs, in terms of 
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undermining the identification and loyalty amongst electors tied to a class identity which parties 
may now downplay. Furthermore, the ‘top down’ denial of class is not reflected in a ‘bottom up’ 
disappearance of all class cleavages. The reduced subjective emphasis on class characteristic of 
social democracy (New Labour much more than the PS) continues to confront objective 
obstacles. For example, both parties are confronted with a class-based electoral cleavage over 
European integration.  
 
More fundamentally, a ‘classless’ social democracy has trouble carving out a coherent political 
economy. The neoliberal backlash in the last quarter of the 20th Century undermined faith in the 
Keynesian paradigm which formed the bedrock of social democracy’s redistributive class-based 
politics in the second half of the 20th Century. The scope for redistribution appears subject to 
ever tighter ‘external’ constraints. At the same time, the Marxist paradigm, which had hitherto 
(albeit indirectly) underpinned the importance social democrats attached to class in 
understanding economic and social relations, was called into question, not least by the 1989 
revolutions. In this context, the questioning of the centrality of class to social democracy can be 
seen as part of a wider search for a guiding set of principles around which to organise social 
democracy’s redistributive instincts. 
 
The problematic relationship between class and post-golden age social democracy is attested to 
throughout this article. There are two sections to this comparative analysis, the first exploring  
the place of class within each party’s identity, and in turn its political economy. The focus of the 
article is on the elite-level conception of class, and elite-level perceptions of the relevance of 
class to party identity and political economy. The second section explores the importance of class 
to electoral strategy. Here again, the focus is primarily upon the elite-level perceptions of the 
relevance of class to social democratic electoral strategy. Thus emphasis is placed upon ‘top-
down’ party elite strategy rather than ‘bottom-up’ socio-economic changes in the class structure. 
 
We unearth significant differences in the importance attached to class by each party, and the role 
that class plays within the party’s identity and analysis of the economy. New Labour has 
expunged class from its frame of reference. The resultant embrace of neoliberal economics has 
undermined the party’s traditional identity. The party has become less recognisably social 
democratic as it seeks ever more accommodation with market outcomes. Conversely, the PS now 
seems firmly camped on social democratic territory it until recently shunned, retaining both an 
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emphasis on class (and divergent class interests), and also the need for political direction or 
mediation of market outcomes to attenuate the antagonistic outcomes of the free play of market 
forces. 
 
Although the declining centrality of class as a structuring feature of electoral strategy is to an 
extent common to both parties, New Labour has gone much farther down this route than the PS. 
The class dimension pervades the genetic origins of Blair’s party, yet he is deliberately eschews 
it, denying the existence of fundamental divisions in society. For all this, he paradoxically owes 
his success a cross-class electoral alliance which eluded Labour for much of the 20th Century. 
Conversely,  Jospin’s party is historically less ‘organically’ tied to class, but explicitly recognises 
the difference between classes – and of need to form a coalition between them. That said, his 
cross-class electoral alliance appears more fragile, given the context of party competition in 
France, and the number of suitors of the working class electorate. We begin, however, by setting 
out how the concept of class will be approached here. 
 
The Concept of Class 
 
 
In this article our primary concern is to explore the way the term is used by the elites within the 
two parties concerned, but it would be wise to set out how class is understood in this article. This 
subject has provoked a heated psephological debate, and no single accepted definition of class 
exists. Evans, however, has rightly observed that the manual/non-manual dichotomy is a crude 
over simplification of the nature of the contemporary class structure, which ‘impoverishes … 
measurement of class position, and, by extension, obscures variations in the composition on 
manual and non-manual classes.’1
 
The Goldthorpe class schema avoids this degree of oversimplification. It distinguishes along 
lines of conditions of payment and employment, degree of occupational security, and promotion 
prospects. Erikson and Goldthorpe differentiate ‘positions within labour markets and production 
units …. In terms of employment relations that they entail’.2 The concept of employment 
relations distinguishes between employers, self-employed, and employees in a manner which, as 
1 Geoffrey Evans, ‘Class Voting: From Premature Obituary to Reasoned Appraisal’, in: G. Evans The End of Class 
Politics? Oxford 1999, p. 8. 
2 Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe, The constant flux: a study of class mobility in industrial societies, Oxford 
1992, p. 37; emphasis in original. 
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Evan notes, ‘reflects the origins of the schema in both Marxist and Weberian traditions of class 
analysis’.3 Goldthorpe identifies employees in a (longer term, more secure) ‘service relationship’ 
with their Employer, such employees tend to possess some expertise and enjoy a degree of 
autonomy in the workplace, and those in a (short-term) ‘labour contract relationship’, who tend 
to be supervised and whose labour contract is closely regulation. 
 
Differentiated along these lines, Goldthorpe’s schema identifies the following class categories, 
the petty bourgeoisie (small employers and self-employed), the service class – or salariat 
(professional and managerial groups, subdivided into ‘higher’ and ‘lower’), the routine non-
manual class (typically lower grade clerical ‘white-collar workers’), and the working class 
(subdivided into semi- and unskilled manual workers, skilled manual workers, and foremen and 
technicians). 
 
This more differentiated conception of class is preferable, but we are constrained by data 
gatherers’ classifications.4 Thus where we do seek to establish the enduring ‘objective’ relevance 
of class to social democratic electoral politics, we cannot always rely on our favoured conception 
of class. French National Statistics and Economics Research Institute  (L'Institut national de la 
statistique et des études économiques – INSEE) indicators, for example, are a valuable source of 
French data, but retain the manual/nonmanual dichotomy. Although unfortunate, this is not 
particularly problematic, since the task here is not primarily to establish the precise contours of 
the class structure and its impact upon voting behaviour, but to understand and critique how 
social democratic elites perceive the relationship between class and social democracy. The usage 
(or non-usage) of the term by political elites in speeches and documents, although it lacks the 
kind of precision set out above, is illuminating as to how social democracy is evolving at the 
beginning of the 21st Century.   
 
Substituting Class? : From Labourism to New Labour 
 
Drucker’s classic study sets out the conventional understanding of the importance of class to the 
Labour Party through exploration of the party’s ‘ethos.’  Ethos ‘incorporates a set of values 
which spring from the experience of the British working class,’ its four core features are loyalty, 
3 Evan ‘Class Voting’, p. 10. 
4 Not to mention the at best partial comparability of British and French class indicators. 
 5
                                                          
sacrifice, attitude to money and a belief in explicit rules. Central to Drucker’s ethos is the idea 
that, ‘it arises out of a shared past, from a series of folk-memories or shared expression of 
exploitation, common struggle and gradually increasing power.’ Deeply rooted in the past, ethos 
reinforces the influence of the party’s ‘own past and of the past of the Labour movement which 
produced and sustains it’ on contemporary developments.5 One should not see ethos as a purely 
constraining influence on party actors, ‘it is possible to create or re-create a past which has never 
existed or which has ceased to exist…since such pasts are impervious to history, few are without 
some mythical elements.’ Thus leaders may invent and evoke pasts at will to gain support for 
their programme so long as they proceed with subtlety and a firm grasp of the contours of 
Labour’s ethos. Furthermore, given the British Labour Movement’s centrifugal tendencies, ethos 
provides some pretty sturdy adhesive, ‘a sense of a common past binds us together. Such a 
shared past is also the ‘organisational glue’ of the Labour Movement and of the party.’6
 
This centrality of the working class to the Labour Party finds organisational expression in the 
organic link with the trade union movement. ‘Rules of affiliation to the Party produced a 
structure which was heavily weighted towards trade union dominance…Thus at the Labour Party 
Annual Conference - the sovereign body of the Party - the blocks of trade union votes soon 
dwarfed those available to the socialist and, later, constituency party organisations.’7 The 
institutional development of the Party was thus shaped by its beginnings within ‘the bowels’ of 
the trade union movement. In financial terms, trade union input in the form of affiliation fees, 
donations and grants were the Party’s life blood. Indeed, only in the mid 1990s did Trade Union 
funding dip for the first time below 50% of Labour’s income.8
 
These ‘Labourist’ organisational particularities had a profound impact. Ideologically, Drucker 
notes, ‘Labour is more closely tied to its trade unionists than any other major party in any major 
country. They set the tone of its thought.’9 The historic class character of the party did not, 
however, politicise class antagonisms and the class struggle. Paradoxically, these roots within the 
exploited class had the opposite effect. Minkin identifies a ‘deep ambivalence towards ‘politics’ 
within the British Labour movement, born out of ‘a distrust of the state, an adherence to 
5Henry Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party, London 1979, pp 9-21 & p25. 
6 Drucker, p . 31, p. 34, p. 35. 
7 Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, Edinburgh 1991, p. 4. 
8 Steve Ludlam, ‘New Labour and the Unions: the End of the Contentious Alliance?’, in S. Ludlam & M. Smith 
(eds.) New Labour in Government, Basingstoke 2000. 
9 Drucker, p. 40. 
 6
                                                          
customary rights and a tradition of independence.’ The laissez faire capitalism of nineteenth 
century Britain, it seemed, had left its mark on the union movement. ‘Self-reliance, the freedom 
to bargain collectively and, by derivation, the preservation of legal immunity from actions in tort 
granted in the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 were carried forward as fundamentals of free trade 
unionism.’10
  
Labour’s class-based origins have, if anything, been an impediment to radicalism. Citing 
amongst others the Social Democratic Federation, Minkin claims, ‘Marxist and socialist 
organisations have often found the union link too constraining and the Party too limited in its 
aims and strategy…[there are] several strands of the revolutionary Left who  since the very 
inception of the Labour Party have seen its form, values and behaviour - Labourism, as some 
have defined it - as the great obstacle to the development of a socialist project.’11 This dimension 
to the union link has been of enduring significance within the party, most recently appreciated by 
Blair when seeking to secure ‘his’ candidates for First Secretary of the Welsh Assembly and 
Labour candidate for London Mayor. As John Monks puts it, ‘most party modernisers now 
accept that the link is a strength, not least because the unions are vital in their role of counter-
balancing the increasingly vocal leftwing of the party.’12 Although this dimension of the union’s 
role in the party may demonstrate some continuity, most other aspects of the relationship 
between class and party have recently undergone radical overhaul.  
 
The Blairite vision is shorn of any reference to the place of the unions, or indeed of any 
recognition of the working class as a distinct entity with a particular set of interests. Whilst this 
outright denial of class does represent a shift, the Labour Party has never been a ‘pure’ working 
class party. One ideological tradition within the party has long sought to transcend class 
divisions, entertaining aspirations for the attainment of a classless society.13 The party has 
always embraced members, activists and leaders from diverse class backgrounds, and has been 
keenly aware of the need to extend its electoral reach beyond the confines of the working class. 
Indeed, in this sense, Jones sees Blair as a continuation of Labour’s revisionist traditions.14  
 
10 Minkin, p. 7. See also Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble, and Mike Harris ‘The Labour Party and the Company in the 
Twentieth Century’ in J. Parkinson, A. Gamble & G. Kelly, The Political Economy of the Company, Oxford 2000. 
11 Minkin, p. xii.  
12 Quoted in Ludlam, p. 118. 
13 See Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism, London 1956,  and Socialism Now and Other Essays London 
1974. 
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Blair talks of people’s equal worth ‘whatever their background, capability, creed or race.’15 
Class is conspicuous by its absence from this list. In a series of speeches in early 1999, Blair 
explicitly distanced himself from Labour’s deep-rooted working class identity. Blair celebrates 
the advent of ‘a middle class characterised by greater tolerance of difference, greater ambition to 
succeed, greater opportunities to earn a decent living. A middle class that will include millions of 
people  who traditionally may see themselves as working class, but whose ambitions are far 
broader than those of their parents and grandparents.’16 This explains the familiar mantra ‘we are 
all middle class now’, and is presented as part of a secular, socio-economic shift, ‘slowly but 
surely the old establishment is being replaced by a new, larger, more meritocratic middle class I 
believe we will have an expanded middle class with ladders of opportunity for those from all 
backgrounds, no more ceilings that prevent people from achieving the success they merit.'17 This 
opportunity-oriented ‘meritocratic’ notion of class, which fails to recognise the propensity of 
capitalism to generate large scale inequalities in society’ is linked to Blair’s neoliberal analysis 
of capitalism, a point returned to below. 
 
If anything, Blair sees the union movement as part of that old establishment, hence the 
‘loosening’ of links with the trade union movement. Blair reconciles such changes to his 
interpretation of Labour’s past, ‘far from abandoning our traditional  support, we are saying that 
in a modern Britain everyone must have the chance to fulfil their potential, whatever their 
background, age, sex or race.’18 Here again, however, the absence of class exerts itself as a 
presence. This is a straw in the wind of a wider shift in the class character of New Labour. This 
redefines Labour’s identity, away from a party seeking the advancement of a distinctive set of 
interests, and towards become a ‘one nation’ party offering ‘fairness not favours’ to its 
traditional working class constituency.19  
 
New Labour refers to citizens, to individuals, or to communities, but never to classes, unless to 
deny the existence of class antagonisms and assert a homogenisation within an expanded middle 
class. It seeks to combat social exclusion, but shies away from the notion of an underclass. In this 
 
14 Tudor Jones, Remaking the Labour Party: From Gaitskell to Blair, London 1996. 
15 Tony Blair, The Third Way: Politics for the New Century, London 1998, p. 3. 
16 Speech at the Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 14 January 1999, Quoted in Michael White,  
‘Meritocracy to replace 'old establishment'’, The Guardian, 15 January  1999. 
17 Quoted in Andrew Rawnsley, ‘The Working Class Can Kiss my arse – I’ve got the boss’s job at last’ Observer 17 
January 1999. 
18 Quoted in White. 
19 See Ludlam, p. 128. 
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regard, a significant difference of style distinguishes Blair from, for example, Smith and Kinnock 
before him. Kinnock, and a thousand generations of Kinnocks before him, remained steeped in 
the working class ethos of the Party. Smith, too, was ‘tied by culture and background to the Old 
Labour universe’20 and both were keen to reconcile the modernizing project to Labour’s 
traditional ethos. Blair, on the other hand, regards superseding of the Party’s working class ethos 
as a sine qua non of modernisation. The explicit articulation of such sentiments represents a shift 
in the relation between the Party’s leadership and the party’s class origins and identity. 
 
This is evidenced most graphically in relation to Drucker’s fourth ‘pillar’ of Labour’s ethos -  
‘attitude to money.’ Drucker remarks, ‘what is impressive is the opprobrium which attaches to 
some in the party who too openly flaunt a middle class salary or education.’21 This contrasts 
rather starkly with that apotheosis of New Labour Peter Mandelson’s reassurance of a Silicon 
Valley audience in October 1998 that New Labour was ‘intensely relaxed about people getting 
filthy rich’, which he followed up a month later with an conference aside disdaining, ‘blue-
collar, working class, northern, horny-handed, dirty-overalled people.’22  
 
These attitudinal changes arguably reflect a deeper shift. The frame of reference of economic 
analysis has changed. Categories such as ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ and ‘class’ are never heard in the 
context of New Labour’s ‘new economics’, which draws heavily on neoliberalism.23 Formerly, 
Labour’s broadly Keynesian political economy could  always be reconciled to a class based 
analysis of politics. As Rogers and Streeck put it, ‘through the alchemy of Keynesian economics, 
the particular interests of workers in redistribution towards themselves was transformed into a 
general social interest.’24 But, at the level of economic ideas, the political economy of New 
Labour has shifted away from a reliance on Keynesian economics. As Gamble and Kelly have 
observed, ‘New Labour is seeking to develop its own distinctive political economy which is not 
rooted in the labour movement, aligned to a particular theory of macro economic management or 
instinctively redistributionist.’25 Within New Labour’s analysis of economy and society, class 
20 Martin Jacques quoted in Andy McSmith, The Faces of Labour, London 1994. 
21 Drucker, p. 14. 
22 Quoted in Andrew Rawnsley, The Servants of the People, London 2000, p. 213. 
23 See Alan Sawyer and Phillip Arestis, ‘The Economic Analysis Underlying the “Third Way”’, New Political 
Economy, Vol. 6 No. 2/2001, pp. 255-279. 
24 Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Productive Solidarities’, in: D. Miliband, Reinventing the Left, Cambridge 
1994, p. 128. 
25 Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly, ‘The British Labour Party and Monetary Union’ West European Politics Vol. 23 
No. 1/2000, p. 21. See also Dan Corry ‘Macroeconomic Policy and Stakeholder Capitalism’ in: Kelly, Kelly & 
Gamble Stakeholder Capitalism, Basingstoke 1997,  pp. 185-202. 
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has no place. Nor does the instinct to redistribute to the ‘working class’, however conceived. 
This has undermined Labour’s traditional political economy. The party has become much less 
recognisably social democratic as it seeks ever more accommodation with market outcomes. 
 
An initial attempt to frame this multi-faceted desire to transcend of class divisions talked in 
terms of ‘stakeholders’ – a bid to escape, ‘the outdated view of the relationship between 
employer and employee as one of master and servant, or the institutional conflict between unions 
and management.’26 Since talk of stakeholding subsided from New Labour’s rhetorical 
vocabulary, what prevails is an increasingly neutral characterisation of the market economy, 
reflecting Blair’s at times enthusiastic embrace of neoliberal economics.27 This embrace draws 
heavily on Gidden’s analysis. As a result, it adopts the same weaknesses and omissions, most 
notably concerning the nature of capitalism. Finlayson observes, ‘Giddens is not convinced that 
capitalism has structural tendencies towards exclusion and oppression. Indeed, he does not 
understand contemporary society through the prism of analysis of capitalism as such.’28
  
One implication of this is a denial of class-based antagonisms. New Labour does not recognise 
conflicting economic interests rooted in distinctions or divisions which are identified with what 
in now considers to be an out-dated economic paradigm. Another facet of New Labour 
weltanschauung is an increased emphasis on individualism and the abandonment of Labourism’s 
collectivist approach.29 As a consequence, political conflict operating at a societal level, such as 
that between classes, forms no part of Giddens’ or New Labour’s individualised political world. 
These developments are part of a wider ideological shift away from an analysis of the economy 
which can be traced back (however indirectly) to the Marxist tradition, employing class as an 
analytical category. Mandelson and Liddle are scathing of the ‘Marxist school’, whose ‘quasi-
scientific view of the world rests on economic determinism and class analysis, propounded by 
those who claim to speak for ‘the working class’.30 In this way, the very notion of class is tarred 
with the same brush as Marxism, the assumption being that both are equally irrelevant to New 
Labour. 
26 Peter Mandelson & Roger Liddle,  The Blair Revolution,  London 1996, p. 24. 
27 See John Westergaard, ‘Where does the Third Way lead?’, New Political Economy, Vol. 4 No. 3/1999, and Ben 
Clift, ‘New Labour’s Third Way and European Social Democracy’ in: S. Ludlam & M. Smith, New Labour in 
Government, Basingstoke 2000. 
28 A Finlayson, ‘Third Way Theory’, Political Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 3/1999 pp. 271-9. See Anthony Giddens, The 
Third Way, Cambridge 1998, and, for a critique, Westergaard, ‘Where Does the Third Way Lead?’ New Political 
Economy, Vol. 4. No. 3/1999. 
29 Giddens, pp. 34-7, p. 65. 
 10
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
New Labour, then, has shifted its identity, away from class, seeking to become more pluralistic, 
and take into account multiple dimensions of identity. In this sense, they have arguably become 
postmodern.  As Gamble notes, the postmodern party realises, ‘there are no longer any such 
primary identities which define the political world … parties have to assemble a coalition and 
develop a programme and style of operation which is sensitive to the multiple and changing 
identities which voters have.’31 However, New Labour have gone further even than this, 
explicitly denying (or assuming away) the existence of class identity, and class divisions in 
society. New Labour’s expunging of class from its frame of reference has undermined the 
coherence of the party’s traditional identity. This threatens to sap the strength of its support 
within its traditional constituency, and thus, as we shall se later, has presented electoral 
dilemmas, as well as paradoxical electoral successes. 
 
A touch of French Class: The Ideology and Political Economy of Jospinisme. 
 
Historically, French Socialism could never claim to be so firmly rooted within the working class 
movement as Labour once was. Until the Second World war, France’s socio-economic structure 
remained predominantly agrarian.32 Manufacturing tended to be small-scale, with 70% of those 
manufacturing workers in plants employing less than six workers, where union membership was 
low, and the political consciousness of workers underdeveloped.33 Furthermore, French trade 
unions were deeply suspicious of political parties. The Charte d’Amiens of 1906 asserted that 
unions, ‘should not have dealings with parties and organisations which may elsewhere freely 
pursue the goal of social change.’34 Union strategy was one of complete independence from any 
political party, and a refusal of parliamentary political means in the pursuit of the interests of the 
working class.  
 
 
30 Mandelson & Liddle, p. 29. 
31 Andrew Gamble, Politics and Fate, Cambridge 1999, p. 24. 
32 Due to France’s drawn out, relatively recent, and only partial industrialisation, agricultural workers outnumbered 
industrial workers in France into the post-war years. It was only in the 1954 survey that manual workers finally out-
stripped agricultural workers, comprising 33.8% and 26.7% of the workforce respectively. Furthermore, the large-
scale Fordist production plants, such as the Billancourt Renault plant were the exception and not the rule until well 
into the 1960s. In 1962, only 37% of the industrial workforce worked in 500+ plants. See Sue Milner, ‘France’ in: 
France S. Berger & D. Broughton, The Force of Labour: The West European Labour Movement and the Working 
Class in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 1995,  pp. 211-244. 
33 See Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France, Oxford 1994, p. 235. 
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In France, it was the ‘mass’ French Communist Party (PCF - Parti Communiste Francais), 
numerically stronger at both electoral and membership level than the Socialist Party, which 
formed the strong ties with the working class through its union links (with the CGT).35 
Paradoxically, these links so characteristic of ‘Northern’ social democracy eluded the (slightly) 
more moderate Socialist Party. The PS failed to gain mass working-class support, and still today 
lacks an ‘organic’ link with French trade unions, which neither contribute financial support, nor 
are they represented on the party’s governmental and administrative bodies. This to a 
considerable extent explains the ambiguous class character of the PS in the twentieth Century.36
 
The detached relationship conveyed certain advantages, allowing the PS to develop its 
programme without requiring union assent. Indeed Kitschelt suggests the PS structure as the 
optimal organisation form of social democratic parties, offering greater flexibility for strategic 
responses to a changing environment.37 Against Kitschelt’s mooted benefit must be weighed the 
cost of a lack of a significant sources of funding38, and a failure to secure a firm implantation 
within the working class throughout the Fordist period. As Jospin puts it, ‘we are less solidly 
anchored, but also less weighed down.’39 The absence of a strong working class membership is 
reflected by the virtual absence of working class representation within the PS elite.40
 
This is not to say that French unionism is irrelevant to the study of the PS, after all 70% of PS 
activists are trade unionists41, but this largely reflects public sector white-collar unionism, 
particularly amongst teaching professionals. The absence of ‘organic’ ties means that, 
historically, the influence of the working class on the PS has been less prevalent. Jospin himself 
concedes that the French Socialists have never been a mass party. This has implications for 
relations with social partners, as well as electoral fortunes; ‘we do not have in France a strong 
tradition of negotiation and social dialogue ... We can experience wide-scale electoral successes 
 
34 Quoted in Jeff Bridgeford, The Politics of French Trade Unionism, Leicester 1991, p. 7. Organised interests were 
illegal in France from the revolution until 1884, when the Loi Chapelier was reformed. 
35 See Milner, p. 213. 
36 See Alain Bergounioux  & Gérard Grunberg, Le  Long Remords du Pouvoir,  Paris 1992. 
37 Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge 1994. 
38 One upshot of this has been some very murky funding practices, notably the URBA and Carrefour scandals, 
which were a significant source of disaffection with ‘governmental’ socialism in the 1980s. 
39 Lionel Jospin, Modern Socialism,  London 1999, p. 5. 
40 David Hanley, ‘The Parti Socialiste Francaise: Socialist Synthesis or Ambiguous Compromise?’ in: S. Mazey et 
al, Mitterrand’s France, Cambridge, 1987, p. 20. 
41 Philippe Marliere, ‘The French Socialist Party’, in: R. Ladrech & P. Marlière, Social Democratic Parties in the 
European Union, Basingstoke  1999, p. 68. 
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followed by major setbacks because we do not draw our support from specific social 
foundations.’42  
 
It should not be inferred from this, however, that French Socialism has eschewed a class-based 
analysis of politics. The influence of Marxism has historically been much greater on French 
Socialism than on British Labourism. Indeed, perhaps in an attempt to compensate for the 
absence of a mass-class base, and in part spurred on by competition from the PCF, French 
Socialism has always been keen to affirm its ‘inter-classist’ profile within the context of its 
quasi-Marxist doctrine.43 Perhaps the most influential post-Epinay44 exponent of a class-based 
analysis of politics, drawing on the Marxist tradition, was the late Jean Poperen. His concept of 
the ‘front de classe’ was widely embraced at the 1981 Valence Congress, where Poperen ensured 
that the idea of compromise between ‘social forces’ (the workers) and the Patronat (employers) 
was written into the (unanimous) motion. Poperen argued that the party itself ought to ‘organise’ 
balance of social forces.45  
 
Poperen’s core idea was that concessions made to the Patronat in terms of subsidies, wage de-
indexation, and state aids, should only be granted in return for social concessions for the 
workforce, secured through the co-ordinated action of the PS, unions, and groups representing 
the unemployed and socially excluded.46 The influence of the front de classe on Jospin’s project 
today endures. Jospin claims, ‘our role is to mediate between the social classes, between those 
who are reasonably satisfied with society as it exists and are reluctant to be penalised the ‘cost’ 
of greater equality, and those for whom the furtherance of equality represents a fundamental 
goal.’ The existence of deep-rooted class cleavages in society is explicitly recognised within 
Jospin’s world-view. For Jospin, the ‘important political and philosophical point’, is that 
‘socialists must aim to reconcile the middle and working classes, though their interests may 
differ and diverge. We must seek to advance their respective interests simultaneously.’ 47
 
In a reprise of Poperen’s Front de classes  terminology of the 1980s, Jospin insists that, ‘our aim 
is to found a new alliance of classes, one that reflects both the sources of our support in society 
42 Jospin, p. 5. 
43 See Bergounioux & Grunberg, Le  Long Remords du Pouvoir. 
44 The modern PS, which grew out of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière founded in 1905, was 
formally established at the Epinay Congress in 1971. 
45 Interview with Marie -Therese Mutin, 23 September 1997. 
46 Jean Poperen,  Le nouveau contrat socialiste:   socialistes et liberté, Paris 1985. 
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and the interests of the country as a whole.’ He cites as one of the three core principles of 
socialist thinking that ‘social classes can be brought together through equality of opportunity.’ 
Jospin talks of the need to rally the middle classes, as well as those whom society has left behind, 
to the ‘cause of equality and social integration. The Socialist Party is an inter-class party; its 
sociological base is broad and heterogeneous, and has been widened in recent years. The left 
today enjoys a significant and increasing support among the middle classes.’ 48  
 
The ‘new class alliance’ is a recurrent theme of PS discourse at the beginning of the 21st Century. 
Jospin notes that ‘French society remains structured by classes, even if their barriers are less 
distinct and they are more mobile’. Jospin’s  project and policies aim to forge a new alliance 
between ‘the excluded, the classes populaires, and the middle classes’. These classes, Jospin 
accepts, ‘certainly have some specific, and at times divergent, interests,  but they also have 
common concerns. They have the same aspirations for the improvement of the employment 
situation, for the reduction of job insecurity, the improvement of the education system, and the 
consolidation of social protection. They can thus unite within our project of social 
transformation.’49
 
Class is thus important not only to the PS’s identity, but also to its political economy. Jospin’s 
Government continues to use the analytical categories of ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ and an at least 
partially class-based analysis of the economy. For example, in reference to ‘fiscal reforms which 
promote greater equality’, Jospin talks of them ‘starting to build a better balance between the 
taxation of capital and labour.’50 Its redistributive aspirations are still couched in the broadly 
Keynesian and class terms New Labour eschews, highlighting the need for redistribution of 
wealth between classes, towards those with a greater propensity to spend, to increase both social 
justice and demand in the economy.51 This is one indicator of the frame of reference for thinking 
about the economy within ‘Jospinism’ – which is still rooted in an altogether non-neoliberal 
 
47 Jospin, p. 14. 
48 Jospin, p. 14 & p. 7. 
49 Jospin, closing speech to the PS Universite d’Ete, 29 August 1999. 
50 Jospin, p. 14. This reflects widespread view that an iniquitous and regressive redistribution occurred, ‘on the 
Socialists watch’ in the 1980s, when workers share of added value dropped dramatically as a result of de-indexation 
of wages, whilst capital profitability rates soared. 
51 See Ben Clift, ‘The Jospin Way’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 72 No.2/2001, pp. 170-179. On redistributive 
record see Jonah Levy, ‘France: Directing Adjustment?’ in: F. Scharpf & V. Schmidt, Welfare and Work in the 
Open Economy: Volume Two, Oxford  2000, pp. 337-344. 
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world view.52 In this sense, we can say that  the PS’s economic strategy retains a touch of class. 
There remains within French Socialism an underlying resonance of notions of class conflict 
rooted, indirectly, in a Marxist analysis of the economy.  
 
However, for all this rhetorical attachment to a cross-class analysis of society, the PS elite has 
been criticised, both by Left wing factions such as the Gauche Socialiste within the party, and by 
Unions (in particular CGT and FO) and the Communist Party. Critique follows the lines of not 
being sufficiently critical in its questioning of the neoliberal paradigm, and failing to speak up 
for the couches populaires – or the working class, most vulnerable to advancing neoliberal 
globalisation. In December 1995, railway unions triggered a series of strikes, sufficient in scale 
to be described as a Mouvement sociale – conjuring up comparisons with May 1968. The catalyst 
for the strikes was in part hostility to the Plan Juppé – a swingeing social security cuts package 
justified as essential austerity measures to prepare the French economy for economic and 
monetary union. The PS faced criticism, both internal and external, for remaining too distant 
from the mouvement and failing to support the worker’s efforts - unwilling as it was to become 
too implicated in such ‘bottom-up’ action.53  
 
Poperenistes offered a more general critique of the PS mainstream’s ‘accommodation’ with the 
de-indexation of wages and flexibilisation of the labour market, arguing that the PS had failed to 
stand up for ‘their’ people – the couches populaires. Poperen felt his conception of the class 
front had been emasculated, with adaptation to neo-liberalism, and accommodating to Patronat 
demands replacing the intended combating of both neoliberalism and Patronat. One Popereniste 
regretfully observes, ‘we did not rely on, or mobilise, the mouvement social, we succumbed to 
economic constraints, but we never created a balance of power to oblige the Patronat to succumb 
to the social constraints.’54
 
The enduring relevance of class to the PS’ analysis of economy and society lends a degree of 
coherence to its political economy. This association with a class based analysis is subject to 
criticism from within the party, both on the grounds of being an antiquated relic (from ‘Blairites’ 
52 See Pierre Moscovici, A La Recherche de la Gauche Perdue, Paris 1994, and   L'Urgence:  Plaidoyer  pour  une  
autre  politique,  Paris 1997.  
53 Interview with Harlem Désir, national secretary in charge of relations with social movements in 1995, and a 
member of the Gauche socialiste faction,  23 November 1997. See also ‘Gauche de lutte et gauche de pouvoir: 
entretien avec Lionel Jospin’, Temps Modernes, No. 587/1996. 
54 Interview with Marie -Therese Mutin, 23 September 1997. 
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such as Bockel), and, more cogently, from Poperenistes, the Gauche Socialiste, and Emmanuelli, 
along the lines set out above. Nevertheless, such a referential provides a framework for 
advocating the need to redistribute wealth to the poorer members of society. This is couched in 
terms of both social justice and the need to reconcile the divergent interests of middle classes and 
couches populaires in the interests of social peace. Paradoxically, although it is today considered 
one of Europe’s more authentic exponents of the political tradition, until the 1990s, the PS 
shunned the term ‘social democracy’55, and Jospin still prefers ‘Socialist’.56 However, the PS 
accepts that it now operates on the ideological territory of social democracy57, and the class 
dimension to its analysis of the economy lends to the PS a recognisably social democratic 
element to its identity. As we shall see shortly, in terms of electoral strategy, the PS is again a 
class act. 
 
Section 2: Class and Social Democratic Electoral Strategy since the ‘Golden Age’ 
 
‘Up to the end of the sixties ... the industrial proletariat was numerically the largest component of 
the electorate, structurally the best organised, morally the most authoritative....it was what Italian 
theorists termed centralita operaia - the ‘centrality of the working class’ - that welded together 
an array of forces of the left. Typically, this is no longer so today.’58
 
Przeworski and Sprague’s Paper Stones attempts to rigorously demonstrate social democracy’s 
‘electoral dilemma’, namely that a ‘pure’ working class strategy will not succeed, because the 
working class was deemed to be shrinking. On the other hand, cross-class strategies aimed at 
courting the middle class involve alienation of some working class support – seen by the authors 
55 The term Social democrat accepts the notion of a compromise with capitalism, which, until the 1983 U-turn, the 
PS firmly rejected, at least rhetorically. ‘Social democrat’ was used as term of abuse of abuse within the party, for 
example, by Chevenement to denounce Rocard. Social democratisation, formally accepting for the first time 
capitalism as the ‘new horizon’ within which the PS would operate, took place at the Arche Congress in 1991. See 
Parti Socialiste,  Un Nouvel Horizon, Paris 1992. 
56 He notably always prefers the terms Socialism and Socialist to Social democracy and social democrat in his 
speeches, see http://www.psinfo.net/. 
57 See the final text of the 1997 Brest Conference, Réussir à Gauche, and the 2000 Grenoble Conference, Ensemble, 
réussir aujourd'hui pour convaincre demain, and Jospin’s Modern Socialism, which, whilst expressing reservations 
about the term (p. 5), nevertheless situates his Government and his party’s project within the European social 
democratic tradition. 
58 Perry Anderson, ‘Introduction’, in:  P. Anderson & P. Camiller, Mapping The West European Left, London 1994, 
p. 11. 
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as more or less a zero sum trade-off. The thesis is ‘proved’ through extensive statistical analysis 
of European electoral results.59
 
Although intuitively plausible, this theory is problematic, as a number of writers have pointed 
out. Firstly, the definition of working class employed by Przeworski & Sprague is rather narrow, 
‘manual wage earners in mining, manufacturing, construction, transport and agriculture and their 
inactive household members’, thus excluding manual workers in ‘unproductive’ sectors, routine 
non-manual and all white collar workers.60 Secondly, it is at variance with the facts, ignoring 
both working-class Conservatism, and the conspicuous successes of cross-class appeals in both 
Britain and France. More helpfully, Marlière’s typology of post war social democracy identifies 
both ‘a strong working class anchoring as far as membership and the electorate were concerned’ 
and ‘an interclassist profile which combined strong support among working-class segments of 
the population with the ability to attract significant proportions of the middle and even upper 
segments of salaried employees’ as core features.61
 
Crude causal relationships between a shrinking industrial manual worker population and fewer 
socialist voters are difficult to sustain. The reason for this mismatch between theory and facts can 
be traced to the flawed, sociological deterministic assumptions made about the ‘micro-
foundations’ of the model – i.e. voter choice. ‘Analysis of electoral politics voter preferences are 
implanted from outside so that workers becomes dupes of macro-actors, in particular, of parties 
and trade unions.’62 A similar level of sociological determinism informed ‘social structural’ 
electoral analyses on both sides of the channel, which saw class as a determinant of voting 
behaviour in Britain and France.63
59 Adam Przeworski & John Sprague, Paper Stones : A History of Electoral Socialism, Chicago 1986, pp. 25,31, 50-
62. 
60 This is another round in an ongoing debate about the appropriate measures of class for psephological analysis. At 
its heart are concerns that the manual/non-manual dichotomy blurs more than it clarifies. See Evans, ‘Class Voting’. 
Specifically on Pzeworski and Sprague’s arguments see Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Class Structure and Social Democratic 
Party Strategy’,  British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23/1993, pp 299-337 and  Desmond King & Mark 
Wickham-Jones, ‘Social Democracy and Rational Workers’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 20/1990, p. 
390. 
61 Philippe Marliere, ‘Introduction’, in Ladrech and Marliere, p. 4. 
62 Buraway, quoted in King & Wickham-Jones, p. 391. 
63 See e.g. David Butler & David Stokes, Political change in Britain: the Evolution of Electoral Choice, London 
1974, and  Guy Michelat & Michel Simon, Classe, Religion et Comportement Politique, Paris 1977, although 
Michelat and Simon account recognises the interaction of religion and class. They highlight the role that 
Catholicism played in shielding workers from class consciousness. They show that Catholicism and 
atheism were the single most important determinants of political class consciousness. 
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Taking on board the above critique, many analysts argue the impact of these sociological 
variables is declining, counteracted by ‘economic’ voting, the declining strength of party 
identification,64 heightened electoral volatility, and declining satisfaction with the political 
system in general and ‘governmental’ parties in particular. Both French and British studies 
contend that the relationship between class and voting is complicated by two factors. Firstly, 
macro-changes in the class composition of the French and British electorates, with a 
fragmentation of homogenous electoral blocs of support which arguably characterised the left 
electorate in the Fordist period. Thus, for example, analysts chart the increasing salience of 
‘sectoral location’ as opposed macro-social class in determining voting behaviour pointing to a 
fairly strong correlation between public sector employment and propensity to vote for the Left.65 
Others saw a blurring of class boundaries brought about by the ‘Taylorisation,’ in particular of 
service sector work, bringing about a ‘proletarianisation’ of white collar workers.66 Still others 
identified a decreasing salience of class as a predictor of voting behaviour, for example with a 
shift from ‘closed class to open elections’, and ‘the decline of class and the rise of issue 
voting’.67 Crewe’s class dealignment thesis argues that, undermined by amongst other things 
‘mixed class environments’, the causal connection between class and party loyalty had withered 
away. 
These theses have not gone unchallenged. Some argue that, whilst the class structure has become 
more complex, class has not diminished in its relevance for the individual voter.68 However, 
whatever the rights and wrongs of the psephological debate, party elite’s perceptions about the 
nature of the class structure and its impact on voting behaviour were changing. Przeworski 
argues that ‘the relative salience of class as a determinant of voting behaviour is a cumulative 
consequence of strategies pursued by political parties of the left.’69 Regardless of the precise 
nature of ‘bottom up’ changes in the class structure and its relevance to voting behaviour, the 
64 For example, 87% of the electorate in 1995 still classed themselves closer to one party than any other, and 75% of 
those retained the same party loyalty as their parents, however, whilst this influence still conditions voting 
behaviour, it by no means determines it, as declining party loyalty demonstrates. See Daniel Boy & Nonna Mayer’s 
‘Introduction’ in: L’Electeur A Ses Raisons Paris, 1997, p. 15 
65 Patrick Dunleavy & Christopher Husbands, British Democracy at the Crossroads, London 1985; see also Daniel 
Boy & Nonna Mayer, ‘Que Reste-t-Il Des Variables Lourdes?’ in: L’Electeur A Ses Raisons, p. 131.  
66 See David Weakliem and Anthony Heath, ‘The Secret Life of Class Voting: Britain, France, and the United States 
since the 1930s’, in: Evans The End of Class Politics?, esp. pp. 102-6. 
67 See Boy & Mayer,  Richard Rose & Ian McAllister, Voters Begin to Choose, London 1986, and Mark Franklin, 
The Decline of Class Voting in Britain, Oxford 1985. 
68  Anthony Heath, Roger  Jowell and John Curtice, Understanding Political change: The British Voter 1964-1987, 
Oxford 1991. Michael Lewis-Beck et al,  How France Votes, London 2000. 
69 Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, Cambridge 1985, p. 100-1. 
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‘top-down’ cognitive frameworks of party elites in the two countries accepted (to different 
degrees) an evolution in the relationship between class and voting.  
 
New Labour Electoral Strategy: Transcending Class?  
 
Labour’s position as the party of the working class was long a given of the British electoral 
scene. Butler & Stokes once noted that class was ‘pre-eminent among factors used to explain 
party allegiance in Britain.’70 The implications for Labour of changes in socio-economic 
structure were captured in the gloomy predictions of Hobsbawm’s widely disseminated The 
Forward March of Labour Halted.71 This impressed upon Labour the need to examine the 
impact of a declining Fordist paradigm on its electorate, with the likelihood of a majority built on 
a working-class electoral base decreasing as societal change advanced. 
 
Commentators saw Labour swimming against the tide of history. Wedded to a declining manual 
working class, and no longer even sure of their loyalty, Labour was seen as trying 
(unsuccessfully) to run up a downward escalator. In truth, both the nature of evolutions in class 
structure, and the link between Labour Party and working class voters posited in some of these 
writings is an oversimplification. The British working class have not always been the loyal 
supporters of Labour folklore.72 Furthermore, for all the pitfalls identified by Przeworski & 
Sprague with such a strategy Labour has long been in the business of courting middle class 
support. For example, in the 1950s, Crosland was steeped in the psephology of his age, and was 
uneasy with the staunchly working class ‘cloth cap’ image of Labourism. This unease was 
predicated on an analysis of a changed social structure which demanded a concomitant change in 
social democracy. Believing ‘society as a whole [to be] less and less proletariat’, and that the 
working class  ‘subjectively are seeking to acquire middle-class status in life.’73  
 
In the mid-1980s, Labour Party electoral strategy documents again began to recognise the need 
to ‘widen our appeal to embrace new occupational groups.’74 By the mid-1990s, Labour’s 
strategy sought to transcend class, indeed to deny its existence. Whereas once the Labour Party 
70 Butler & Stokes, Political change in Britain. 
71 Eric Hobsbawm, The Forward March of Labour halted?, London 1981. 
72 See e.g. Frank Parkin, ‘Working Class Conservatives: a theory of political deviance’, British Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 18/1967, pp. 278-90, and R.E. Pahl and C. D. Wallace ‘Neither angels in marble nor rebels in red: privatisation 
and working class consciousness’, in: D. Rose Social Stratification and Economic Change, London 1988. 
73 Quoted in Mark Wickham-Jones, The Labour Party and Economic Strategy, London 1996. 
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could accurately be characterised as a predominantly class-based party in terms of its  ‘political 
communications strategy’, today, reference to class is explicitly rejected. As we saw earlier, 
Blair reformulates Labour’s class identity, and celebrates ‘a new, larger, more meritocratic 
middle class’.75 The party’s evolution since 1983 seems to conform in many respects to 
Kirchheimer’s transformation thesis,76 Pattie observes that the Labour Party ‘has moved from a 
‘mass’ party based in a declining, and decreasingly loyal social group, to something closer to the 
‘catch-all’ party, drawing support broadly.’77
 
This is as much a result of ‘top-down’ party elite strategy as it is of any ‘bottom-up’ socio-
economic changes in the class structure. As Sartori noted, the salience of factors such as class 
depends on the willingness of parties to politicise them, since ‘the party creates the ‘subjective’ 
class (class consciousness).’78 The novelty lies in the fact that New Labour has explicitly 
avoided not only the politicisation, but even the recognition of class, assuming instead that ‘the 
class relations that used to underlie voting and political affiliation have shifted dramatically, 
owing to the steep decline in the blue-collar working class.’79 Reflecting the assumed 
homogenisation of class, an insider remarks of the pre-Blair party, ‘Labour had failed to 
understand that the old working class was becoming a new middle class: aspiring, consuming, 
choosing what was best for themselves and their families ... by 1983, 53% of working-class 
fathers had sons in non-manual work ... they had moved on and Labour hadn’t ... there was a new 
majority in Britain – new working class voters, new middle class voters. And year on year 
Labour and the new majority were parting company.’80 This analysis oversimplifies a complex 
reality, and is highly questionable, notably for its reliance on a manual/non-manual dichotomous 
conception of class which is questioned by many scholars,81 but it nevertheless came to underpin 
Labour’s strategic vision. 
  
 
74 Labour Party National Executive Committee, 1987. 
75 Speech at the Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 14 January 1999, quoted in Michael White,  
‘Meritocracy to replace 'old establishment'’, The Guardian, 15 January 1999. 
76 Otto Kirchheimer, `The transformation of West European party systems', in: J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner 
Political Parties & Political Development, London 1966. 
77 Charles Pattie, ‘New Labour and the Electorate’ in Ludlam and Smith New Labour in Government, p. 52. 
78 Giovanni Sartori, ‘From the sociology of politics to political sociology’, in: S. M. Lipset , Politics and the Social 
Sciences, Oxford 1969, p. 84. 
79 Giddens, p. 20. 
80 Phillip Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, London 1998, pp. 4 & 22. 
81 See most recently G. Evans (ed.) The End of Class Politics? 
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Strategically, for Labour elites, the Union link came to be seen as a major electoral millstone. As 
Ludlam notes, ‘the link [was] condemned as the last major obstacle to rebranding Labour as a 
classless progressive electoral vehicle.’82 Although the link has, so far, survived, there has been a 
very conscious assertion of Labour’s autonomy from the unions, as captured in the ‘fairness not 
favours’ stance. The repositioning of Labour, now not tied to any class, can be seen in the 
rewriting of Clause IV. This removed reference to ‘the workers by hand or by brain’, in favour of 
‘all of us as a community ... the many, not the few’. Within the Blairite world view, conflicts of 
interests are not readily recognised, as a result of a broadly neoliberal view of the economy 
outlined above. This acted in concert with a desire for an ever broader appeal. The culmination 
of Labour’s consciously pursued strategy of ‘declassifying’ its image and electoral appeal was 
that, by 1997, only 19% of voters perceived Labour as representing a sectional working class 
interest, compared with 64% in 1987.83
 
The approach is not, however, unproblematic. Although Przeworski & Sprague overstate their 
case, they do highlight a dilemma, and a tension in Labour’s relationship with its mixed-class 
electoral base. As Kenny & Smith note, ‘a convincing electoral victory requires the votes of its 
core working-class supporters as well as significant middle-class voting. The coalition that 
Labour needs to marshal through the ballot box has only been successfully stitched together on 
three occasions – 1945, 1966, and 1997.’84 The party elite attempts to resolve the tension (in the 
form of potential incompatibilities of appeals to the ‘traditional’ working class and the middle 
class) of its ‘inter-class’ electoral appeal by assuming away class-based antagonism. This has not 
been a consistently winning strategy. Some interpreted disappointing mid-term results, with 
Labour gaining only 36% in Council elections in May 1999, just three points ahead of the 
Conservatives, in this light. This election saw the fall of some Labour Town Halls formerly seen 
as bastions of its core support, such as Sheffield. As Pattie notes, ‘New Labour looked 
vulnerable, and there was worrying evidence that support was falling most in its former 
industrial heartlands.’85 Concerns were voiced, for example by former cabinet Minister Peter 
Kilfoyle, who left the Government in a bid to ‘reconnect’ the Party with the grass roots. 
 
82 Ludlam, p. 111. 
83 Pattie, p. 45. 
84 Michael Kenny and Martin Smith, ‘Interpreting New Labour: Constraints, Dilemmas and Political Agency’, in 
Ludlam and Smith New Labour in Government, p. 246. We may now, of course, add a fourth instance in 2001. 
Unfortunately, the in-depth analyses of the 2001 result have not yet been published, hence that election cannot be 
discussed in detail here. 
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One possible explanation of the New Labour elite’s strategy, which is not without pertinence, is 
that Labour’s traditional core working class constituencies ‘have nowhere else to go’, and that 
such mid-term trends at second order elections will be reversed at general elections. Record 
abstention levels in 2001, especially high in working class areas86, suggests New Labour’s 
expunging of class from its frame of reference may have undermined the loyalty of the party’s 
traditional support. Furthermore, in the context of a devolving British constitution, the nature of 
party competition is changing amidst semi-proportional electoral systems and an evolving party 
system. Labour’s comforting logic, rooted in the First Past The Post norms of the Westminster 
Model, is being at least partially undermined, notably in Scotland.  
 
The loss of working class support is problematic for the Labour party since, despite its catch-all 
aspirations, it continues to rely disproportionately on the support of the working class. Labour’s 
success rests upon what Curtice calls ‘a two-pronged coalition. There is no doubt that it needs 
the support of middle-class and less radical voters. But it needs to retain its traditional voters 
too’.87 For example, in 1992, 70% of Labour’s vote came from manual employees, whilst 80% 
of those voting Labour thought of themselves as working class. Webb characterises Labour as, ‘a 
catch-all party which nevertheless enjoys particularly heavy support within the working class.’ 88 
Paradoxically, for all Labour’s distancing itself from a class based appeal, one remarkable 
feature of Labour’s landslide in 1997 was the recovery of working class Labour support to 
almost 1960s levels – 60.2%.89
 
PS Electoral Strategy: The ‘Class Front’  
Despite the evolutions charted above, the French electorate continues to be ‘structured’ by the 
pertinence of the left/right divide90, and Boy & Mayer argue that class still strongly influences 
voting behaviour. Using INSEE class indicators, they note, ‘the principal electoral cleavage 
today opposes independent earners, who vote mainly for the Right, with salaried workers, who 
 
85  Pattie, p. 53; see also Ludlam. 
86 Paul Whiteley et al, ‘Turnout’, in: Norris Britain Votes 2001, Oxford 2001, pp. 214-5, although, as they note, 
‘aggregate analysis cannot identify if this was due to abstention by Labour supporters or to some other effect.’ p. 
214. 
87 John Curtice, ‘Class Acts’, The Guardian, 22 March 2000. 
88 Paul Webb, ‘The British Labour Party’, in: Ladrech and Marliere, p. 103, 104. 
89 Pattie, p. 62. 
90 See Michael Lewis-Beck, ‘Introduction: The Enduring French Voter’ in: M. Lewis Beck  How France Votes, 
London 2000, pp. 1-14. 
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vote  more often for the Left.’91 However, these sociological factors do not tell the whole story, 
as one glance at recent French electoral history illustrates. Counteracting trends are at work, with 
volatile voters display an increasing propensity to vote ‘economically,’ shift allegiance or 
abstain. Although relying on the questionable manual/non-manual dichotomy, Boy & Mayer do 
unearth a shift in the relationship between class and vote. The proportion of manual workers 
voting for the left has dropped significantly from 68% in 1988, to 52% in 1995, whilst the 
number of non-manual workers voting for the Left fell from 56% in 1988 to 46% in 1995. 
Whereas in 1978, 70% of manual workers voted for the Left, by 1995 that proportion was down 
to 52% of manual workers (and 51% of non-manual workers).92  
Given this volatile French electoral context the PS finds itself obliged, at every election, to 
attempt to ‘reconstitute’ its electorate, bringing together diverse ideological orientations and 
people from widely differing social classes. In recognition of a more complex class structure, and 
a less sociologically deterministic French electoral context, less reducible a bipolar world 
between proletariat and Patronat, Bergounioux has characterised the PS’s dilemma thus, ‘the 
cleavages are numerous. The class cleavage is no longer on its own a determinant of political 
cleavages.’93 Yet despite recognition of the limits to class based appeals class remains, within 
the PS elite, an important dimension of its political offering. Indeed, in the context of ‘bottom-
up’ socio-structural trends which suggest that, if anything, class is becoming a slightly less 
reliable foundation on which to base electoral support, the ‘top-down’ elite-level formulation of 
electoral strategy perspective, the PS remains conspicuously attached to class based electoral 
appeals. 
 
According to PS grandee Louis Mermaz, the PS electorate, ‘is composed of working class voters 
… but we also have a large middle class electorate ... it is a ‘class front’, but the classes are very 
different. We extend from the proletarian, and the unhappy left-voting unemployed, to the 
relatively comfortable middle classes, and who – intellectually – vote Left through a concern for 
liberty and justice, and a desire to change society.’94  
 
91 Daniel Boy & Nonna Mayer, ‘Que Reste-t-Il Des Variables Lourdes?’, pp. 114, 108. INSEE indicators distinguish 
between ‘independent’ earners (Farmers, Artisans, Traders, the self employed), salaried manual workers, and 
salaried non-manual workers, and thus do not escape the manual/non-manual dichotomy.  
92 Boy and Mayer, p108-110. 
93 Alain Bergounioux, ‘L’Avenir de la Social-Démocratie’, Nouvelle Revue Socialiste, No. 11/1990, pp. 109-116. 
94 Interview with Louis Mermaz, 1 October 1997. 
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One reason for this continued insistence upon class is the nature of party competition in France. 
Until the split in 1998, the FN’s populism, successfully targeting of the couches populaires, 
made the FN a repository for working class voters disaffected with governmental socialism.95  
This in part explains the PS’s affirmation of its cross-class appeal explicitly including the 
working class. As Le Gall noted of the 1993 defeat, ‘The FN, who totalled 12.6%, is markedly 
more successful [than the PS] among workers, employees, amongst the young, and even more so 
among those classing themselves as ‘underprivileged’.96 The PS’s inability to replace the PCF in 
urban areas with large immigrant populations has considerably aided FN progress, and 
undermined PS support with the working class.  
 
Dissatisfaction with the PS spanned all socio-economic barriers. Le Gall, writing here in his 
capacity as the PS’s foremost electoral strategist claims that, ‘on March 21st, ‘inter-classist’  
socialism gave way to a sociological quasi-indeterminism.’ According to BVA polls, amongst 
the lower middle class, 41% voted for the mainstream right and only 21% for the PS and ‘divers 
gauche’. Nor was the performance amongst the workers much better. ‘At the level of its 
electorate, the PS has performed a ‘super-Bad Godesburg’, but sadly without social democracy: 
only 20% of white-collar and blue-collar workers voted for it.’97
 
The 1995 presidential election proved the resilience of the left/right divide in France, due in no 
small part to the systemic pressure exerted by the presidential electoral system. The election saw, 
‘a partial return of the Left’s electoral base (industrial and clerical workers, teachers, middle 
managers) after the nadir of 1993.’ Yet the sociological profile of the 1995 Jospin electorate 
continued to display worrying traits of a desertion by industrial workers (only 21% support) and 
lower clerical workers (only 23% support).98 The benefactor of blue and white collar worker 
desertion seemed, once again, to be the FN. The FN outpolled every other party amongst 
industrial workers, and the mapping of local FN strongholds correlates closely with some lost PS 
bastions, notably the Mediterranean coast and the Nord/Pas-de-Calais areas. Despite such 
95 In addition to the Cote d’Azur, where the FN has long challenged the PS, new areas of socialist weakness 
emerged in 1993 from which the FN benefited. See Gérard Grunberg, ‘Que Reste-t-il du Parti d’Epinay?’ in P. 
Perrineau & C. Ysmal, Le Vote Sanction : Les elections legislatives des 21 et 28 mars 1993, Paris 1994, maps 4 & 5 
show the FN outstripping the PS vote From East of Marseilles to the Italian Border.  
96 Gérard Le Gall, ‘Une repetition des elections de printemps 1992’, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No. 
964/1993, pp. 6-19, p. 22. 
97 Le Gall, ‘A la Recherche des electorats perdus’ Vendredi Idees, June 1993, pp. 21-22. 
98 Alistar Cole, ‘La France pour Tous? – The French  Presidential Elections of 23 April and 7th May 1995’, 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 30/1995, pp. 338 & 343. 
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‘sociological indeterminism’, and the ‘super-Bad Godesberg’ of 1993 and – to a lesser extent - 
1995, class remained central to Jospin’s ‘top-down’ construction of his electoral appeal after he 
took the helm of the party as First Secretary in 1995. As noted above, Jospin’s aim is ‘to found a 
new alliance of classes’99 reconciling the excluded, couches populaires and middle class, whilst 
recognising the potential conflicts between their interests. This has been a hallmark of the PS 
electoral strategy. 
 
In 1997, Jospin aimed explicitly to reach parts of the PS’s target electorate which had proved 
elusive in the early 1990s. Analysis of the first round seems to confirm some of the PS 
strategist’s hopes regarding the reconquest of parts of their old core constituencies. ‘According to 
SOFRES, the PS made its most significant progress among the young (+11%), white collar 
workers (+18%), and blue collar workers (+11%). Similarly, according to BVA, the PS 
considerably increased its influence among those classifying themselves as ‘lower middle 
class’(+10%), and as ‘underprivileged’(+14%).’100 The SOFRES post-electoral survey – in 
identifying the sociological composition of the gauche plurielle electorate in the second ballot - 
was encouraging evidence of the strategy’s success. The Left and the Verts, ‘won an absolute 
majority of support  … among middle management and the intellectual professions, and the 
‘intermediary’ professions (52%). They also won the support of one blue collar worker in two, as 
well as a majority of support among the ‘salariat’ (52%). They received 57% support among 
public sector workers, and the vote of one in two of the unemployed.’101
 
The fragility of the PS recovery was, however,  underlined by the growth of the FN’s working 
class vote. The first round ballot of May the 25th continued to display the enduring strength of 
the FN.102 In sociological terms, the FN electorate is revealed to be groups targeted by the PS 
electoral strategists. ‘FN support continues to develop among the working class, with the support 
of one in four manual workers ….. Le Pen’s party made their most significant advances among 
those subjectively identifying themselves as ‘underprivileged’ (+9%).’103 The second biggest 
advance was among those calling themselves ‘working class’ (+5%). 
 
99 Jospin, p. 14. 
100 Gérard Le Gall, ‘Legislatives 1997 : Un scrutin singulier pour la gauche plurielle’, Recherche Socialiste, 1/ 1997, 
p. 22. 
101 Le Gall, ‘Legislatives 1997’, p. 33. 
102 Having won local successes in Orange, Toulon and Marignane in 1995, the FN added to its localised power base 
in Provence-Cote d’Azur with a local election victory at Vitrolles, outside Marseilles, in February 1997. 
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Within the PS, some are increasingly prepared to abandon the concept of two core electorates, 
believing attempts to impose such coherence on a complex reality  are artificial.104  On balance, 
there is an enduring attachment to old ‘core’ constituencies, but at the same time heightened 
awareness that phenomena such as the FN’s advance, socio-economic change and electoral 
volatility require the PS to always be looking beyond such groups for support. With the 
implosion of the FN, and its dismal scores in the 2001 municipal elections (where both the FN 
and the Mouvement Nationale Républicaine scored less than 1.2% of the vote105)  it remains to 
be seen whether the hitherto strong affirmation of class was born out of strategic expediency or 
ideological attachment.  In this context the degree of emphasis on class within the PS’ political 
‘offering’ for 2002’s ‘decisive’ elections will be instructive. 
 
Conclusion 
 
One pillar of post-war social democracy’s relationship with class, namely the instinctive 
propensity to redistribute wealth to the workers, appears to be under threat. Programmatically, 
New Labour’s abandonment of Keynesian political economy, and concomitant embrace of a 
neoliberal view of the economy, assuming away the existence of class. Blair denies the existence 
of fundamental class-based divisions, proclaiming a meritocratic ‘classless’ society. The 
propensity of capitalism to generate large scale inequalities in society is underplayed, and New 
Labour accordingly confines its redistributive urges to elements of the ‘working poor’. The class 
identity of Labour pervades the party’s history, yet Blair deliberately shuns it.  
 
On the other hand, Jospin’s party, whilst  historically less ‘organically’ tied to class, explicitly 
recognises the difference between classes – and of need to form a coalition between them. PS’s 
analysis contrasts sharply with ‘Blairism’ in its more sceptical engagement with neoliberal 
economics and its explicit recognition of class-based conflicts of interest in society. Yet even the 
PS mainstream, for all its enduring ‘neo-Keynesian’ emphasis, has been criticised for not being 
sufficiently robust in its defence of the couches populaires – for example when it recently 
introduced tax cuts targeted the whole of society, including high earners.  
 
 
103 Le Gall, ‘Legislatives 1997’, p. 32. 
104 A sentiment expressed by numerous PS National secretaries in interview with the author. 
105 See the Interior Ministry Website, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/elections 
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This is symptomatic of a more general malaise within 21st Century social democracy. It is 
grasping for a new political economy – a new guiding set of principles to inform an egalitarian 
economic strategy. In the post-war era, Keynesian economics and a class-based analysis of 
society provided both intellectual coherence, economic rationale, and an electoral constituency. 
With Keynesianism undermined, and class decreasingly central to social democratic analysis of 
economy and society, the road ahead is an uncertain one. The PS are much less inclined to cut 
loose the ties with class, yet even their instinctive propensity to redistribute wealth to the workers 
is subject to ever tighter constraints.  
 
The enduring reliance of both formations upon a traditional working class electoral base is 
demonstrated by the degree of consternation within the PS in the 1980s and 1990s over desertion 
of the couches populaires to the FN, and (milder) anxieties within New Labour about 
diminishing support in ‘the heartlands’. Nevertheless, class is seen by electoral strategists in both 
parties as a less solid foundation for electoral appeals (albeit to different degrees). Paradoxically, 
for all Blair’s conscious choice to depoliticise the class issue, his electoral coalition of 1997 is 
built upon very considerable success within the working class. Due in part to the French party 
system, Jospin, despite his affirmation of a class-based appeal, presides over a considerably more 
fragile electoral coalition, with much less loyal working class support. The next decisive 
elections in France may hinge on how those sections of the working class which the PS lost to 
the FN in the 1980s and 1990s will vote in the wake of the FN’s apparent marginalisation.  
 
Yet Blair’s ‘top down’ denial of class is not matched by a ‘bottom up’ disappearance of class 
cleavages. For all the substantive differences of electoral context and electoral strategy between 
PS and New Labour, both parties face similar problems in their attempts to resolve tensions over 
Europe, where a class cleavage seems to exist which divides both parties’ cross-class appeal, and 
which may prove increasingly problematic as Europe becomes an increasingly salient electoral 
issue as integration advances. Voting on European issues, according to Bergounioux & Grunberg 
‘reinforces the cleavage between the middle and working classes.’106
 
In Britain, New Labour achieved a derisory 28% in the June 1999 European elections – eight 
points behind the Conservatives. Opinion polls unearthed a schism which, for all the talk of 
dealignment and the declining relevance of class, seemed to operate along class lines. Labour’s 
106 Alain Bergounioux  & Gérard Grunberg, L’Utopie A l’Epreuve, Paris 1996, p. 292. 
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working class voters were much more anti-single currency than its ‘middle England’ support.107 
As Evans notes, this problem has emerged since Labour’s U-turn on Europe between the 1983 
and 1987 elections. Anti-European sentiment ‘fitted rather well with the ‘Old Left’ and euro-
sceptic character of [Labour’s] working class support base.’ Analysis shows that, ‘class 
differences in attitudes to Europe are extremely stable ... Labour’s traditional working class 
support base was and is consistently more Euro-sceptic even in the era of new Labour.’108  
 
In France, the pitiful 14.5% Rocard’s official PS list received in the 1994 European elections was 
anticipated by Grunberg, for many years a Rocard advisor, who saw the split in terms of social 
cleavages which emerged in the Maastricht referendum as an ominous portent. ‘70% of cadres 
supérieurs …. and 57% of ‘intermediary’ professions voted yes, whereas 57% of white collar 
workers, 58% of blue collar workers … voted no.’ Although in part explained by the rival Tapie 
list splitting the Left vote, the European election results represented for the PS, ‘a worrying 
situation, because its electoral success of the 1970s and 1980s was built on a synthesis of the 
values and expectations of the classes moyennes supérieures and ‘couches populaires’.’109 A 
synthesis between these increasingly divergent constituencies over the European question would 
at best prove elusive.  
 
Le Gall’s analysis of the European election results seem to suggest that the cleavage anticipated 
by Grunberg did indeed materialise, ‘globally, the crisis of support for the socialist lists of 1994 
confirms the weak credibility of the PS among the young, white and blue collar workers; 
phenomena observed in the 1992 regional elections, and accentuated in the 1993 legislative 
elections.’110 The PS faired considerably better in the 1999 European elections, France, 
increasing its vote share rose from 14.5 per cent to 22 per cent, within an overall gauche plurielle 
showing of 38 per cent. Nevertheless, Grunberg’s analysis suggests the need for careful handling 
of the European issue so as not to offend the working class. Jospin successfully achieved this in 
1997, with his four conditions on the Euro. However, his hand was forced at Amsterdam, and his 
bid to reorient the process of European construction in a more jobs and growth oriented direction 
was undermined. In the event of welfare retrenchment which could plausibly be blamed on the 
107 Pattie, p. 53. See also Paul Whiteley, ‘Quids in – or out’, The Guardian, 22 June 1999. 
108 Geoffrey Evans, ‘Europe: a new electoral cleavage?’, in: G. Evans and P. Norris, Critical elections, London 
1999, pp. 209 & 214 & tables 11.3 & 11.4. 
109 Gérard Grunberg, ‘Les francais et l’Europe’, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No. 970/1994, pp. 20-26. 
110 Gérard Le Gall, ‘Europeennes 1994 : des elections de politique interieure’, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No. 
971/1994, p. 6. 
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Growth and Stability Pact, or an economic downturn which could plausibly be blamed on the 
ECB, the European schism within Jospin’s cross-class appeal could re-emerge.  
 
As European integration advances, and with it, potentially, the salience of European issues in 
deciding domestic British elections, similar caution will be needed by New Labour. Although 
New Labour no longer recognises the fact, both parties rely on successfully stitching together an 
electoral coalition combining working and middle class voters. Thus the electoral fortunes of 
both the PS and New Labour will continue to be crucially affected by the enduring class cleavage 
in the years ahead. Furthermore, the class-based electoral cleavage over European integration, 
which attests both to the increased salience of ‘issue voting’, and to the enduring relevance of 
class voting, threatens to further alienate eurosceptic working class voters from pro European 
social democratic parties, fragmenting their cross class electoral coalitions. This could present 
electoral socialism in the early 21st Century with an electoral dilemma akin to that outlined by 
Przeworksi and Sprague’s analysis of 20th Century socialism. 
